Nussbaum, Martha. (2000). Women and human development: The capabilities approach. Reviewed by John Ambrosio, University of Washington

Nussbaum, Martha. (2000). Women and human development: The capabilities approach. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pp. xxi + 312. $24.95          ISBN 0-521-66086-6 Reviewed by John Ambrosio, University of Washington January 25, 2001         In Women and Human Development, Martha Nussbaum attempts to shift the theoretical terrain on which international development policy is currently situated. In doing so, she constructs a universalist feminist philosophy based on central human capabilities that, if met, would provide the minimum threshold necessary for the development of all people—although her specific focus is on the situation of poor women in India. In place of cultural relativism and aggregated conceptions of the good put forward by utilitarian economics, Nussbaum proposes a set of interrelated and indivisible capabilities, conceived as human rights, that offer moral guidance for the development of political principles that can be translated into constitutional guarantees. The capabilities provide individuals with opportunities for functioning, for making self-defined choices possible. These choices, however, are virtually meaningless without the material preconditions that enable their functioning. Thus, the central question driving the capabilities approach is: What are individuals actually able to do or to be?         Nussbaum's primary objective is to place these spheres of choice "beyond the whim of majoritarian politics" by translating them into constitutional guarantees. For her, the political goal of justice, of meeting the threshold for each capability, supersedes liberty--outweighing and morally constraining choices that conflict with the central principle of political liberalism: "do no harm to others." Ensuring equal access to the central capabilities, she argues, should "constrain all economic choices" (p. 33). Individual and collective choices that result in differential access to the capabilities, she argues, ineluctably violate this governing principle.         Given existing social inequities and asymmetrical relations of power, the capabilities approach requires "spending unequal amounts of money on the disadvantaged" in order to bring every person up to the "same level of capability to function" (p. 99). Thus, universalizing opportunities for full human functioning would require redistributive policies, although the absolute level of resources devoted to establishing functional capabilities would differ according to the specificity of material conditions. Because the exercise of certain types of functioning in childhood are an essential precondition to developing "a mature adult capability," Nussbaum argues that the state has a compelling interest in "any treatment of children that has a long-term impact on these capabilities" (p. 90). Thus, it is imperative that children be given genuine opportunities to exercise capabilities that are vital to their functioning as future citizens.         In addition to material prerequisites, actual functioning depends on an internal process of self-definition, of developing a conception of self as a "bearer of rights and a citizen whose dignity and worth are equal to that of others" (p. 13). The practical value of Nussbaum's theorizing lies in providing poor women with a "framework in which to view what is happening to them and a set of concepts with which to criticize abuses that otherwise might have lurked nameless in the background of life" (p. 36). By naming the nameless, and providing women with a conceptual framework to identify and criticize abuses, Nussbaum hopes to foster a sense of entitlement and to strengthen the moral authority necessary to resist social norms that constrict or deny opportunities for "truly human functioning." Nussbaum's approach is not prescriptive, women may legitimately choose to live in accordance with traditional beliefs and values, but it must be a choice rather than a social compulsion. In this way, individuals who possess strong convictions about particular conceptions of the good could support the capabilities approach without having to significantly alter their beliefs. Nussbaum is not interested in criticizing the central tenets of particular belief systems, but in opening up possibilities for choosing differently. Creating the possibility of making certain choices does not require that they be chosen.         Choice is problematic, she argues, because of the many ways it is shaped and deformed by "habit, fear, low expectations, and unjust background conditions" (p. 114). To what degree can individuals make authentic choices if their psychic needs and desires are ineluctably formed within the social and historical specificity of certain normative contexts? In effect, Nussbaum argues that some choices are better than others, that the specific conditions in which choices are made influence the possibility of choosing authentically. That is, she insists that informed choices, those based on critical reflection and deliberate intentionality, are more likely to reflect the real interests and desires of individuals than choices made under desperate or constraining circumstances. Thus, the political rights of self-determination and affiliation embodied in the central capabilities are vital to the formulation of genuine human needs, of creating opportunities to make functional choices.         The capabilities approach was developed by Nussbaum during eight month-long residencies as research advisor at the World Institute for Development Economics Research, an institute of the United Nations University. The concept of functional capabilities is based on the pioneering work of Amartya Sen in development economics, although Nussbaum goes beyond comparative notions of capability equality by insisting on a threshold level of capability that can "provide a basis for central constitutional principles that citizens have a right to demand from their governments" (p. 12).         Nussbaum's list of ten central capabilities, which are tentative and open to revision, reflect her awareness of the "specific details and dynamics" of poverty in India—a situation that led to her to place greater emphasis on issues such as bodily integrity, control over one's political and material environment, and human dignity. The list also reflects Nussbaum's belief that the problems of poor women in the developed and developing world should take center stage among the concerns of middle-class women. In addition to ensuring the basic capabilities of life and bodily health, she is concerned with internal capabilities, such as the ability to "imagine, think, and reason," to develop and sustain emotional bonds, to formulate conceptions of the good through critical reflection, and to affiliate with and show compassion for others. Truly human functioning, she argues, also means being able to "laugh, play, and enjoy recreational activities," as well as the ability to "live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature" (pp. 78-80). The capabilities serve as a kind of moral umbrella designed to accommodate cultural variation while establishing cross- cultural thresholds of human capability.          Among the many social forces that compel affiliation and influence adaptive preferences, however, is the free market--and the values it promotes. Curiously, Nussbaum does not directly address the enormous power of the global market to frame individual choices and drive human desires and preferences. Instead, she elides the topic, hoping that the moral claims embodied in the capabilities list will somehow "steer the process of globalization" (p. 105). Given the enormous influence of neoliberal schemes of privatization and structural adjustment, and the extension of capitalist social relations to every corner of the globe, it is not clear why Nussbaum believes corporate and political leaders might follow her moral guidance.         Although culture plays a dominant role in socio-emotional development, Nussbaum argues, individuals possess an innate capacity for autonomous choice that is to "some extent independent of culture" (p. 155). Despite this claim, she places little trust in unexamined desire, preferring to rely on substantive rather than procedural goals and values to provide a normative basis for a "partial theory of justice," one that is contextual and contingent given differing social and material conditions. The very idea that "crucial choices would be made about who gets to have milk in tea and who only sugar," she argues, is more difficult for Western philosophers to comprehend than "the big facts of location and political organization and religion" (p. 23).          Nussbaum introduces the principle of moral constraint, or "anything that results in cruel or unjust treatment," to set the boundaries of permissible choice. Choices that result in differential treatment concerning access to the central capabilities are by definition outside the boundaries of what can reasonably be chosen. Thus, discriminatory or repressive choices that constrict or deny equal access to the central capabilities violate the principle of moral constraint.         The paradox in her conception of authentic choice, however, is that the formation of informed desire is itself a precondition for the kinds of functionality made possible by the central capabilities. Thus, how can informed desire, which is essential to making genuine choices, develop prior to establishing the political rights and social conditions that make its formation possible? Although Nussbaum does not state so explicitly, the capabilities approach can only be implemented through a dialectical process of historical change in which thrusts from below and pressures from above move together toward a synthesis.         Nussbaum's central aim is to develop "cross-cultural norms of justice, equality and rights" that make international quality of life comparisons possible while remaining sensitive to local particularities (p. 7). She grounds her work in the concrete realities and substantive issues facing poor working women in India, using the specificity of two women's lives as dialectical reference points in constructing and justifying her theoretical positions. In doing so, Nussbaum constructs an unusual philosophical argument infused with the voices, and informed by the life experiences, of the women for whom she is theorizing. Intent on making her philosophy "responsive to reality," Nussbaum's analytical arguments continually reach out to the reality of everyday social life for relevance and meaning, all the while maintaining a firm commitment to developing universal standards of human capability.         Nussbaum's conception of functional human capabilities challenges the dominant discourse of resource allocation within international development economics. Rather than focusing on the amount of resources individuals are able to command, Nussbaum is concerned with what "each and every" person is "actually able to do or be" with the resources available to them. In effect, she wants to disaggregate the central concepts and analytical categories of international development theory, unpacking and replacing them with ones that reflect the particularity of individual choices, desires, and local conditions. For similar reasons, Nussbaum rejects John Rawls' (1971) primary goods approach to distributive justice because it neglects the "varying needs of individuals for resources and their ability to convert resources into valuable human functioning" (p. 68). That is, the concept of primary goods fails to take into account the ability of each person to translate available resources into functional choices.         Like international development policy, the debate about public school reform has become situated within the conceptual and moral boundaries of utilitarian economics. Thus, applying the capabilities approach to the issue of educational reform would require a parallel shift in the rhetorical terrain of discussion, and a redirection of national priorities away from the neoliberal gospel of cost-benefit analysis to a conception of education based on developing each and every person's capacity for "truly human functioning." Changing the discursive frame of reference would mean reformulating how educational issues are problematized, and redefining the parameters of legitimate and reasonable public discussion about education.         The "glorious totals and averages" such as GDP per capita that serve as normative economic measures find their educational analog in norm-referenced standardized tests and other aggregated assessments of student achievement. When applied to schooling, the capabilities approach is not concerned with how particular schools, districts, or states perform, but how each student is doing relative to where they began. That is, the capabilities approach asks a different question: What is each student able to do or to be given the actual choices and resources available to them?         Standards-based school reform and high-stakes testing violate Nussbaum's principle of undifferentiated access to the central capabilities by imposing normative standards of achievement in the absence of normative standards of actual functioning. In passing Clinton's Goals 2000 education plan, the U.S. Congress rejected the inclusion of "opportunity to learn standards" that would have required every state to provide students with sufficient resources to meet the new state-developed standards. The standards-based school reform efforts spawned by Goals 2000 and a series of national education summits violate the principle of undifferentiated access by requiring all students, despite their relative privilege or disadvantage, to meet the same academic requirements.         The more crucial a specific functioning is to attaining other central capabilities, Nussbaum argues, the more governments are entitled "to promote or require actual functioning over the opportunity to function" (p. 92). Given the centrality of education to the capabilities, Nussbaum calls for compulsory primary and secondary education for all children, fully aware that education is a contested site that has the potential to reproduce ideologies based on hierarchy and prejudice or provide students with opportunities to transcend socially constructed knowledge and identities. Governments can also require a degree of functioning necessary to ensure the current and future availability of certain choices that may not be supported by a majority of citizens.          While accountability is necessary to ensure actual functioning, high-stakes testing does not serve this purpose, and in fact, leaves the state unaccountable in terms of providing standards that give every student the same functional opportunities. Authentic accountability is closely linked to what actually goes on in classrooms and is sensitive to diversity in school populations. The issue is not whether schools should be accountable, but how accountability is determined. That is, whether schools should engage in hit-and-run testing or use multiple forms evidence in ongoing assessments that evaluate a range of intelligences and cognitive skills, and what students can reasonably be held accountable for given widely differing educational needs and access to resources. While governments have a legitimate interest in ensuring accountability, they should not possess sole authority to determine standards for actual functioning. Educational authority for making such decisions must be shared with those who have the greatest stake in the personal development and academic success of students: parents, teachers and other school staff, and district personnel.         Taking the capabilities approach seriously would require major changes within and outside of education. Although guarantees of equal treatment in state constitutions have provided the basis for legal efforts challenging long-standing inequities, they have proved inadequate in ensuring every student access to the same functional choices. In addition to increased state and federal spending on education, undifferentiated access to the central capabilities would require a significant expansion of the national welfare state. This would mean not only guaranteeing access to basic human necessities such as housing, food, and health care, but creating new entitlements such as quality day care, child support, and paid parental leave and vacation time, that enable parents to adequately care for and nurture their children.         What would public education in the U.S. look like if we took Nussbaum's capabilities approach seriously? That is, if society were able to marshal the will to translate them into political goals and constitutional guarantees? If the principle of treating each and every person as an end became a moral and legislative mandate, schooling would change dramatically because education would no longer be about meeting external social, economic, or political demands. Assembly-line schooling would be abandoned and replaced by a conception of education driven by the interests, needs, and culturally relevant learning styles of individual students. Schools would necessarily be small personalized communities in which affiliation and reciprocity would serve as operative moral and organizational principles. Developing the capability of practical reason, or the critical reflection necessary to plan one's life, means accepting and valuing the many ways in which students know, learn, and construct their own conceptions of the good.         At the present time in India, she argues, "the single most effective way for government to promote women's sense of their worth and their entitlements is to promote women's collectives" (p. 289). Nussbaum views women's collectives as the primary locus of social transformation in India while she simultaneously privileges the establishment of constitutional guarantees linked to the central capabilities, some of which are already contained in the Indian constitution, but remain unenforced. This tension reflects the inherent contradictions in Nussbaum's project. That is, as with the case of informed desire, the political rights embodied in the capabilities are, in important ways, a precondition to developing the new "regimes of choice" exemplified by the women's collectives. At the same time, further development of voluntary affiliative associations like women's collectives are vital to creating the social and political pressure necessary to establish constitutional guarantees that protect and extend new spheres of choice.         Nussbaum's project sharply diverges from the neoliberal ideology and market values that currently dominate public discussion of educational reform in the U.S. The group solidarity and non-hierarchical communities of care Nussbaum found so important in strengthening women's sense of power, self- worth, and identity are applicable to schooling, internal capabilities that are being systematically undermined by the imposition of high-stakes tests that diminish hopes and lower expectations for the majority of students across the U.S. who have not been guaranteed the opportunity to meet them. Public education remains a vigorously contested and contradictory site, one that may yet provide opportunities to begin shifting the national debate in the direction shown by the capabilities approach. Reference Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. About the Reviewer John Ambrosio is a Ph.D. student in the Program in Curriculum and Instruction at the University of Washington, Seattle. His main areas of interest are multicultural education, philosophy of education, epistemology, and educational reform. This review was produced under the special editorship of David Blacker.