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Macedo, Donaldo and Bartolomé, Lilia I. (1999). Dancing with Bigotry: Beyond the Politics of Tolerance. Reviewed by Donald S. Blumenfeld-Jones, Arizona State University

 

Macedo, Donaldo and Bartolomé, Lilia I. (1999). Dancing with Bigotry: Beyond the Politics of Tolerance. N.Y., N.Y.: St. Martin's Press

Pp. 192

$35           ISBN:0-312-21608-4

Reviewed by Donald S. Blumenfeld-Jones
Arizona State University

October 8, 2000

The Dance of Alienation and the Politics of Invitation
or
What Does Love Have to Do With It?

          In the introduction to Donaldo Macedo's and Lilia I. Bartolomé's new book, Dancing with Bigotry: Beyond the Politics of Tolerance, Christine Sleeter writes that Macedo and Bartolomé "challenge us to ask: How can we prepare young people, as well as teachers, to analyze events around us using a political consciousness? They ask how we can teach people to see through the ideological fog of mainstream interpretations of pluralism" (p. vii). Macedo and Bartolomé, in their opening chapter, write that "as the end of the century draws closer, one of the most pressing challenges facing educators in the United States is the specter of an ‘ethnic and cultural war,' which constitutes, in our view, a code phrase that engenders our society's licentiousness toward racism" (p. 2). As a response to these conditions and possibilities, Macedo and Bartolomé offer an analysis of the situation rooted in how language is used by educational policy makers, the media, and teachers to think about education, language which, in numerous ways, enacts oppressive situations which damage children and their futures. Their focus is on ideology critique in which they lay out the ways in which our culture is based on bigotry, and they move from critique to solution approaches to this major social issue. In this essay review, I want to respond to the ways in which Macedo and Bartolomé go about the work they lay out before us. Before doing this, however, I should like to situate my project in this review.
          My main interest resides in opening up a dialogue between myself and their work, a dialogue situated in the critical theory tradition. I have a twofold purpose is doing so. First, I want to model a form of reading which I think may be helpful in contributing to the ongoing efforts in which they and I are participating, that of achieving greater social justice for all. (This is as opposed to the usual review approach which tells you whether or not their work is good.) Achieving social justice is extremely important and too often I have seen the community of critical thinkers being fractured by internecine arguments which only expend our energies in the wrong places and for the wrong reasons (in my opinion). We must learn to help each other through constructive dialogue. In my case, while I do not thoroughly agree with everything that is going on in this text, this does not mean that I would disavow the text or the work of the authors. I do not believe that we must either excoriate or celebrate the work, as if it were a finished object presented for our approbation or disavowal. Rather I hope that they and I can meet on the ground of common concern and help the project move forward. Second, and coordinated with the above, I want to respond to what I think is a problem in their approach. This problem is situated in exactly their site of activity, the use of language in creating oppressive situations. Because of these interests, I will not rehearse the content of this text in a complete way but will, hopefully, leave the review reader with the desire to know more about Macedo's and Bartolomé's project. I will, here, merely briefly recount their concerns and then focus my attention on suggesting strategic initiatives. Macedo and Bartolomé focus their attention on multicultural and bilingual education through a series of chapters entitled "Dancing with Bigotry: The Poisoning of Racial and Ethnic Identities," "Tongue-tied Multiculturalism," "Racism as a Cultural Factor (A Dialogue with Paulo Freire," "Insurgent Multiculturalism (A Dialogue with Henry Giroux)," and "Beyond the Methods Fetish: Toward a Humanizing Pedagogy." Their concerns revolve primarily around how language and identity are mutually interdependent and they argue that by preventing children from learning in their first language, but being forced to adopt English entirely, much of the carrier of valued heritage and life is lost to these children. This is a powerful argument, worthy of further airing and exploration. While I was aware of this issue, Macedo and Bartolomé truly made it clear in a way I had not previously encountered and their discussion of this issue deserves a wide readership for the book. They are also concerned with issues of pedagogy which leave so many children out of educational experience and which prevent teacher's from becoming "political" in the sense of aware of the dimensions of oppression which inform and shape school life. I would say these are two of the major themes of the book.
          While I am in accord with the substance of their arguments I am concerned, as I have already written, with the way in which they go about their work. I would characterize my concern as "strategic" with the proviso that "strategy" is understood to be not merely about "rhetoric" or be concerned with how to "manipulate" a situation but, itself, carries substance. As I see it, form and content are deeply interrelated. I parallel my concern with the long-standing disagreement in the field of critical work around what Henry Giroux and others have labeled "the politics of clarity" about which Giroux and others have written so extensively. I am, through my response to Macedo and Bartolomé, opening up what I call "the politics of invitation." My concern is with thinking through how we invite others into the projects of social justice in such a way that they see them as their projects also. Lest I be misunderstood, I certainly recommend this text to the reader for I think they are doing important work which deserves, nay, needs our attention. I simply wish to open up a dialogue about how we go about our work. To begin with, in the title to their book, Macedo and Bartolomé present us with an image of bigotry as a dance we perform. This metaphor appears in the chapter involving Paulo Freire in which Macedo writes,
In the dialogue that follows we attempt to understand how ideological manipulation of history hides the racist fabric of our society behind the façade of democracy that, in turn, enable us to maintain some form of dignity in our eternal dance with bigotry. (p. 84)
          This metaphor is of great interest as it casts ideology differently from its usual image. Often ideology is thought of as a mental state possessed by an individual and our desire is to eradicate the state of negative ideology from that individual. By presenting the metaphor of dance, Macedo and Bartolomé afford us a view of bigotry and ideology as something we do together. That is, by likening bigotry to dance they suggest that bigotry (as ideology) is a coordinated effort among members of our society just as dancing together requires cooperation from both partners in dance. If the dance is to change both partners need to participate in that change.
          Out of this metaphor the question arises: Who are the partners in this dance? Macedo and Bartolomé clearly suggest that the partners are those who are bigoted and those who are the objects of that bigotry. This echoes Paulo Freire's dichotomy, in Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1970), of the oppressed and the oppressor. In that work, Friere teaches, as I read him, that the oppressed and the oppressor are inextricably linked. He further teaches that the oppressed cannot be oppressed except that, in deep ways, they are allowing the oppression to proceed. The oppressor, of course, gladly oppresses because he or she perceives personal gain out of the situation. He or she does not understand, however, that through the oppression of others he or she, too, is oppressed. Oppression is, inevitably, a reciprocal relationship. This is not to say that the oppressed are to be blamed for the situation but, rather, emergence from the situation requires an understanding of how he or she has internalized the rationality whereby his or her oppression seems reasonable. Further, the oppressed must come to an awareness of the mechanisms and results of oppression, if oppression is not to be revisited in new social situations. To put it more succinctly, as W.B. Yeats put it in a brief poem:
                    The Great Day
Hurrah for revolution and more cannon-shot!
A beggar upon horseback lashes a beggar on foot.
Hurrah for revolution and cannon come again!
The beggars have changed places, but the lash goes on.

(Yeats, 1956. p. 309)

          If the oppressed do not understand oppression they are more likely, if they gain the power seat, to act in similarly oppressive ways themselves. "Revolution," in this case, doesn't mean change but, rather, the constant revolving of a wheel in which all positions become the same position.
          Freire's idea about the relationship between the oppressed and the oppressor finds voice in the critical theory use of dialectical thinking. Dialectical thinking, in my estimation, involves the holding of two diametrically opposed ideas which are, simultaneously, inextricably linked such that one cannot be thought without the other. In one sense the two terms are absolutely necessary to each other. To eradicate or move beyond the opposition we must understand how one term cannot be privileged over the other. If such privileging prevails we get Yeats's notion that the dichotomy remains in force rather than being transcended. In these senses the above discussion of the oppressed/oppressor relationship represents a dialectical approach to thinking.
          It is in this strategic area that I have some difficulties with how Macedo and Bartolomé have gone about their work. As I have indicated, they dichotomize the world, dividing it between victims and victimizers but in what I feel is an undialectical manner which I fear maintains and even strengthens the opposition as a life-structuring mechanism, thus leaving the situation in place rather than changing it. For instance, in writing about the conservative attack upon bilingual education they assert as follows:
Many educators will object to the term "colonialism" to characterize the present attack . . . some liberals will go to great length to oppose our characterization . . . rationalizing that most educators who do not support bilingual education are just ignorant . . . This is tantamount to saying that racists do not really hate people of color; they are just ignorant . . . [But] one has to recognize that ignorance is never innocent and is always shaped by a particular ideological predisposition . . . the attack on bilingual education or a racist act due to ignorance does not make the victims of these acts feel any better about their victimization. (p. 40)
          This dichotomizing of the world into an evil set of victimizers (including educators) and innocent objects of victimization (as opposed to victims who are not innocent but also participate in the oppressive situation) misconstrues the interconnected character of these two groups. In fact, the whole notion of "victim" seems problematic to me, carrying with it the cultural weight of passivity and weakness. While Macedo and Bartolomé strongly criticize educators and policy makers for dehumanizing children of color, in an ironic twist I perceive them to dehumanize teachers through demonizing them as enemies. Such dichotomizing will, I believe, alienate the very people they seek to convince. They do so through language usage as well as ideas. Their language is replete with war metaphors, calling hegemonic intellectuals such as Charles Murray and his colleagues "cultural legionnaires" (p. 88) and Dinesh d'Souza as a "cultural commissar" (p. 80). They consistently talk about "attacking" conventional multiculturalism. In other words, they are utilizing the same rhetorical tactics of which they are so critical.
          We are admittedly caught in a dilemma here. In Civilities and Civil Rights (1980), William Chafe writes that the civil rights movement in the U.S., following the Brown v. Topeka KS Supreme Court decision, was stymied in the most progressive city in the South, Greensboro N.C. The black leadership of that community was consistently told by the white leadership that they would have to be patient and allow the white leadership to implement the court mandate in a methodical and measured way if progress was to be made. This came to be understood, by the young Black college students at N.C. A&T; University, as a way of doing nothing. Eventually they became disgusted with the situation and enacted the Woolworth's sit-in and took to the streets in protest marches, led by Jesse Jackson, a student leader at N.C. A &T; at the time. Chafe tells us that this was the galvanizing moment for the development of the movement, sparking protests across the South. However, he also tells us that while these protesters demanded immediate change (an uncivil act in Southern culture) they did so without rancor, loudly and calmly simultaneously. In Jesse Jackson's subsequent history, as far as I know, he has not resorted to war-like language although he has been clearly firm and principled. Chafe further recounts a much later incident in Greensboro in which, in 1979, members of the Communist Worker's Party, calling for a "Death to the Klan" rally in Greensboro, were gunned down in the streets by Klansmen although the U.S. government had informants in the Klan who were aware of the intentions of the Klan to bring weapons to the protest. The Communist Worker's Party also came armed, although they called for a peaceful march. Clearly the Klan and the U.S. government were terribly wrong in this situation and the CWP had a right and obligation to march. But it seems also clear that incendiary language, which matches the language of the opposition, only stimulates the kinds of divisions that we are seeking to transcend. As I have said, the situation is complex and there are no easy answers.
          With this in mind, I am trying to make clear reasons why we should be concerned with whether or not this discourse is alienating educators by creating war-like conditions. Even though educators have not been concerned with the alienation children feel when separated from their first language and even though we are in a battle for the lives of children and even though Freire himself, in his chapter in this book, uses the metaphor "battle" to characterize what is happening, we must be cautious. I recall that Freire has been often concerned with alienation as he writes about changing oppression through love. Indeed, in this text he puts it this way:
When I am confronted with the problem of racial discrimination . . . my first reaction is one of anger mixed with pity. By pity I am not referring to the victims of discrimination. I pity those who discriminate. I pity their lack of human sensibility. I pity their exaggerated arrogance . . . and their lack of humility. . . . I prefer the humanism and humility that exist in my position. . . . [for] there is no other basis on which to judge one another, than upon the basis of membership in the human race. (pp. 85-86)
          Freire moves, in this series of statements, from anger to humility and humanity. It is this move which seems to me to be so central and, also, difficult to achieve. It does not, I think, necessarily fit with today's temperament. To argue against building walls of anger is not, however, so that educators should be exonerated from complicity but, rather, that they must be helped to understand their own oppression even as they benefit from real social, economic, and cultural oppression of others. And it is not simply a matter of empathy. Educators must be brought up against their own racist inclinations learned at the knee of their culture. However, it is one thing to help them see this and another to accuse them of actively and consciously supporting it.
          In this wise I think it is necessary to acknowledge how each of us (including Macedo and Bartolomé) is mired in the hegemonic complex and, to some degree, complicitous with its ends. What do I mean by this? Remembering that hegemony is the way in which the dominant social fraction maintains power by accessing the consciousness of the people and remembering that hegemony, while an active force is also an invisible force, I find it difficult to understand teachers as conscious purveyors of the bigotry dance. Indeed I would argue that in an important way teachers are as much subject to hegemonic consciousness as anyone else and there has been little in their education to counter this. We can hardly position them as co-conspirators without recognizing that we are all hegemonized beings and each of us, in our own way, may be doing the bidding of the hegemonic social fraction. By dichotomizing the world in the way that they do, Macedo and Bartolomé may be reinforcing the hegemonized and dangerous position which teachers hold and disable those teachers from thinking in new ways. If we would have, as Macedo and Bartolomé would have, particular groups of children treated with greater respect and if we would have, as they would have, positive political action taken, then we must treat with care and concern those who are, I would argue, unconsciously doing the work of the dominant social fraction. We must invite them in, not isolate them.
          Macedo and Bartolomé write that bilingual education must "constitute and affirm the historical and existential moments of lived culture" (p. 54). I would argue that no less needs to be done with educators. It is always surprising, when discussing issues of culture with young teacher preparation students, that they do not recognize, if they are Anglo, that they, too, have a culture. Rather everyone else has a culture. This is due to their education in the belief that "culture" equates with "exotic" or different from Anglo culture which becomes the unmarked norm. Do we, in our teaching, fight with our students as to their mistaken ideas or do we help them uncover why they would be so positioned and what are the outcomes of such positioning? I am arguing for the latter. While Macedo and Bartolomé are undoubtedly correct when they write that even bilingual educators must be implicated in ignoring class issues and reproducing social inequity and in practicing the privileging of middle-class and elitist standards, thereby ostracizing whole discourse communities, they should recognize the ways in which those educators lives are also diminished thereby.
          It may be that Macedo and Bartolomé and I have different views of what it means to be critical. By "critical" I mean the uncovering of that which is hidden and a notion that everyone lives hidden lives and ideologies. This means that critique and the critical does not stop with those who seem to be on the other side. Critique and the critical must be turned upon ourselves so that we do not overstep our boundaries and engage in acts of hubris, which can only mean, I believe, the failure of our project. From a dialectical perspective, the maintenance of the polarities as interconnected and the use of those polarities in a wide-spread manner, even turning them upon ourselves, is an analytic necessity for coming to more warranted critical conclusions. Therefore, my concern with dialectical analysis is not a mere intellectual concern, but is central to a critical cast of mind. And to be more clear, I am not arguing that Macedo and Bartolomé do not recognize this necessity but in the present work I do not find that it is sufficiently featured.
          As I wrote at the beginning, much of Macedo's and Bartolomé's work focuses upon ideology critique: critique of underlying assumptions and beliefs which then animate social action. Social action takes the form of policy formation, idea development and dissemination, and pedagogical practice. Another way to describe their work is as critical hermeneutics as they unpack the meaning of legal and policy language and the language of teaching. One important aspect of critical hermeneutics is historical reference. By "historical reference" I mean that we must understand how legal language, policy language and the language of practice have come to be, whose communities contributed to their development, how they are connected to other aspects of their times and, perhaps most importantly, how they fulfill the logic of the times, expressing in functional terms how to get through the day. Is there anyone that does not "want to get through the day?" Only be understanding, historically, how this language and these practices are supportive of the users' lives and make sense to them can we begin to offer alternatives that are more life-affirming. While Macedo and Bartolomé certainly engage in historical discussion, I do not find it to be in a sufficiently full way but rather a recounting of the events without contextualizing.
          Without such historical reference, ideology critique becomes ideological (in the negative sense) and does not help us see how our own conditions may be tempered or altered. That is, we must be helped to understand how a particular ideology does not come into being de novo but only within a context. In so understanding, we may be able to note more fruitfully our own contexts which are continuing to support the existence of that ideological structure. I would have liked to see, in this book, more attention paid to many more of the social forces at work which coalesce to bring about a particular cultural formation (such as a policy initiative). Such understanding by no means validates the event but it does allow us to make it more understandable and provide ways of responding more authentically to the situation at hand. As an example, in Arizona bilingual education is presently under strong political attack and there is increasingly wide-spread support for its demise. While this turn of events is reprehensible we should try to understand the economic and cultural forces at work to focus our attention away from a thorough-going, intelligent response rather than in the presently rabid way in which both sides of the issue are berating each other and, once again, the conservative right seems more able of connecting with the voting constituency than those groups who seek to maintain bilingual education. We must see the ways in which the public has been made economically and socially fearful of non-English speaking people and combat that fear with honest talk about it without either demonizing the opposition or threatening the public. Since, in this case, voting is based in part on strong visceral reactions, we must acknowledge the salience and meaningfulness of those reactions (you cannot simply wish them away through reasoning) and not merely dismiss the opposition as misguided fools. Alienation of the potentially understanding voting public only serves to crystallize opposition.
          One way in which we might work would be through the hermeneutic practice of play in which we ask the linguistic question, "What happens when we change language? How is meaning altered and how are new visions of possibility offered through such play?" In so doing we get a better understanding of how language functions, an understanding which I believe is that the heart of Macedo's and Bartolomé's work. What we want is such an understanding in order for each reader of the work to more effectively recast their own thinking.
          Let me give an example of playing with language by focusing on the term "illegal alien" which is both implicated in the fear which I think animates much of the public policy initiatives of which Macedo and Bartolomé are so rightly critical and is used throughout their text. We can start by substituting other language for it, moving from "Illegal alien" to "uninvited guest." Further we might specify, rather than "guest," a nationality such that the term becomes "uninvited Canadian," "uninvited Columbian," "uninvited Cuban," "uninvited Mexican," "uninvited German" and so forth. What happens when we attach a specific to the term? We can suddenly see the negative prejudice which exists against certain peoples versus other peoples. In this country we would not picture an illegal Canadian when we hear "illegal alien" and we would be hard pressed to interpret that person as being an "illegal alien." We reveal that not all our guests, uninvited or otherwise, are equally welcome or desirable. Our illegal aliens come from more than merely outside our political borders but from black, empty spaces, dangerous, cold and death dealing. Such are connotations of the term "alien." And just as the spaces from which such people come carry those qualities, so too the people from those places are made other, strange, different, dangerous and fraught with inherent criminality. It seems as if being an "illegal" is equivalent, ideologically, with being "alien."
          When we think of "alien" we may also think of "alienated." We may ask: "From what are such people alienated? From civilized humanity? From being human (think of the film "Alien")? Does a confrontation with alien-ness cause us to feel differently from ourselves, so that the alien-ness presents us with a personal possibility from which we shy? If we stopped thinking of our so-called "illegal aliens" as the empty-handed, criminal evil ones that the language and daily media coverage may portray but, rather, as people seeking employment in what they perceive to be a more economically helpful environment, then we might understand how valuable they are. For many of us, our own ancestors were equally "illegal aliens." Just as with our ancestors these present day immigrants render service to our communities doing work needed by all (indeed some border state governors are talking of re-establishing the category of "guest worker" to allow such people to work here legally). But it is not just that they participate in the community by providing that which is needed; they partake of the life of the communities in which they live. They contribute, as any guest would, in order to repay the host for kindness. What are their contributions? They bring their ideas, hopes, and ways of doing for both themselves and their children. And, if we were to conceive of them as guests and us as hosts, then we, as proper hosts, would want to bring kindness to bear in order to comfort the guest. A host takes responsibility for her/his guests. In the case of these guests, those kindnesses take the form of health care and education which enable people to focus on the service they are rendering to the community because they do not have to worry about such necessities. Perhaps some people do not enjoy drop-in guests. Even in this case would they turn those guests from the door? I think not.
          Without the kind of re-reading of language enacted above and with the consistent use of such offensive language as "illegal alien" I believe that the difficulties are actually substantiated. That is, if we do not teach others how to read in inviting ways that help them connect with the difficulties we may actually be substantiating the prejudices against which we fight. One point of this analysis is to suggest that the power of language is such that we can re-conceive our situations and, in some limited way, help change to occur. I write "limited" because an underlying assumption of ideology critique is that it leads to such change, that "things" of the mind lead "things" of the body. While I am extremely sympathetic to this perspective (indeed have practiced it in my own writings) I have become increasingly concerned with a lack of an opposite perspective: material change affects ideological change and that the usual perspective draws upon, in an inverted way, Marx's notion of base structure and superstructure in which the superstructure, which includes ideology, is epiphenomenal to the base structure. In reverse fashion ideology critique assumes that the superstructure contributes to a determination of the base structure, of practical activity. I find both perspectives lacking in dialectical analysis.
          I wrote, at the beginning, that the trajectory of the text was toward solutions to the problems. I find these solutions to be strongly embedded in the two interview chapters with Freire and Giroux and Macedo's and Bartolomé's final chapter on pedagogy. The solutions to which I am referring aren't so much laid out in "things to do" but, rather, in casts of mind which can identify that which will answer the dilemmas at hand. In Freire's work I have always been struck by the sheer and huge humanness of it and that can be strongly found here. Freire sees, through his phenomenological and existential lens, the ways in which people live mystified and confused lives and he, as he says even in this book, pities the racist. He demands humility on the part of the oppressor (and the oppressor's workers, such as teachers) but he also demands love, for if there is no love there will be nothing to love and the revolution will be based on hate, exactly the emotion which motivates the oppressor. The above analysis of "illegal alien" is layered with hate and fear on the part of those who readily use such terms. I am not convinced, however, that they understand how the term encloses and promotes hatred. If we cannot reveal to them, without sending them away from us, this fact then we will not succeed in achieving change.
          In the interview chapter between Giroux and Bartolomé, I believe that Giroux offers a way out of the demonizing tendency of the book. Bartolomé writes that caring of teachers is
problematic because in seemingly creating a comfort zone under the pretext of caring, they sloganize that we need to love our students, even though they don't critique the very structures that generate devaluations of subordinated students. (p. 103)
          Giroux responds as follows:
I am not supporting a notion of caring that promotes this type of abuse and escapism. On the contrary, I am simply arguing that all forms of caring cannot be reduced to this ideological position. Caring for students matters, and I think it is essential that any decent pedagogy make it a condition for becoming a teacher. . . . we need to appropriate those critical elements in a pedagogy of caring that do not lend themselves to the kind of narcissism you are talking about. . . . caring . . . linked to the issue of social justice . . . (p. 103)
          In this, Giroux is dialectically revealing how caring possesses both the characteristics of being enabling and disabling. We can not easily dismiss caring as always wrong but must understand it in its complexity. In so doing we can, I would argue, perhaps be able to show teachers the multi-dimensional (rather than conventional) way of thinking about caring so that they might understand how a conventional mode of caring may be anything but caring. This approach begins with the notion that these are well-meaning people who do care for the children in their classrooms but they have not been allowed, due to education and culture, to find out what that means. I realize such thinking will not, necessarily, invite teachers into the social justice projects, but I would argue that not thinking in this way is more certain to alienate more teachers from the project.
          Giroux goes on to state: "The struggle over literacy is fundamentally about the ability of people to narrate their own histories and experiences within a politics of cultural difference and recognition . . . the struggle over language, in part, is about the battle over identities (p.109)." Sharon Welch, in Communities of Resistance and Solidarity (1985), writes about "dangerous memory." She means, by this, that as we remember our own lives we also come to remember the lives of others and we find that the lives of oppressed others are always implicated in our own. How can we do this if we do not offer opportunities for teachers, in this case, to narrate their own lives in a critical way that cares for them as it reveals them? In my experience as a qualitative inquirer I have found that teachers, like many people, are desirous, after so many years of isolation in their stand-alone classrooms, of telling their own stories. This is the first step to rewriting those stories.
          In the final chapter Macedo and Bartolomé , while discussing various pedagogical forms and the necessary political consciousness which should accompany them, state what I think of as an extension of my argument. They write, "Schools of education should . . . create spaces where the development of an ethical posture informs . . . one's position vis-à-vis the human suffering that certain populations of students face in their community and in their school" (p. 151). They go on to argue for keeping justice, equality, democracy and fairness in the forefront of our thinking. I would suggest that our task is to enact an ethics in which those who seem to be benefiting come to understand how, when even one member of their community suffers unjustly in an anti-democratic, unfair condition, then we all suffer. We must admit to our own weakness in this regard and not think about raising up the oppressed. We must, in a certain way, stop seeing them as the oppressed (as if they are different from us) but as people, like us, who are worthy and filled with dignity but who can teach us something about human dignity precisely because they have suffered. This, in turn, requires a cast of mind that is not filled with anger but with love, even against all odds. As an example I suggest looking to the South African reconciliation movement which ensued upon the coming to political power of the ANC. Bishop Tutu understood that there could be no peace in the country unless all members of the community talked publicly about how they participated in apartheid. The very fact that the transfer of power was essentially peaceful and emanated from a sense of love for all South Africans, even those who did not want love (the Afrikanners) testifies to the ways in which change can occur more surely in such an atmosphere.
          Lastly, I would not want the reader to think that I am denying the suffering which takes place, presently, in many cities across our nation and the world. This suffering cannot be borne in silence nor can it be supported. It is not a matter of politely waiting for things to change. What is needed, however, is a lessening of the fractures between groups. This can only come about, I think, through a politics of invitation and this, in turn requires a language that is inviting rather than divisive and alienating. We must help each person to a creative reading which reveals the hidden potentials of language and humanness and brings us from what Paul Ricoeur (1970) has called "a hermeneutics of suspicion" to "a hermeneutics of the restoration of meaning." These, too, are dialectically related and empty when only one or the other is privileged.
          In sum, my concern is with developing a "politics of invitation" enacted through love and reconciliation. What does love have to do with it? Everything, I think, if we are to invite those alienated others (who may not even be aware of their own alienation) into activity which will better the lives of children and their own lives as well. This is not a sentimental love, nor "tough love," but, rather, a love based on seeing the other as fully human and hoping that s/he can see her/his other as fully human as well (not as somebody needing to be made into a full human but not human yet). It is a critical love but it is love nonetheless.

References

Chafe, W. (1980). Civilities and civil rights: Greensboro, North Carolina, and the black struggle for freedom. Oxford Eng.: Oxford University Press.

Freire, P. (1970). Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Trans. Myra Bergman Ramos. New York: Herder & Herder.

Ricoeur, P. (1970). Freud & philosophy: an essay in interpretation. Trans. Denis Savage. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Welch, S. (1985). Communities of resistance and solidarity: a feminist theology of liberation. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.

Yeats, W. (1956). The Collected Poems of W.B. Yeats. NYC: The Macmillan Company.

About the Book Authors

Donaldo Macedo is Distinguished Professor of Liberal Arts and Education and Lilia I. Bartolomé is Associate Professor at the Graduate College of Education, both at the University of Massachusetts, Boston.

About the Reviewer

Donald S. Blumenfeld-Jones is an Associate Professor of Curriculum Studies at Arizona State University. His main research interests are critical social theory and education, the application of hermeneutics to curriculum research, and the place of authority in education as a curricular issue. He has a book chapter in a forthcoming book in which he enacts a critical hermeneutic evaluation of dance curricula. He has also been participating, as program evaluator, in a curriculum development project at a school on the Navajo Reservation. He has presented a Bourdieuean analysis of this work at various conferences and is also writing a chapter of poetry and other literary forms as a form of analysis of the experience for a forthcoming book on alternative approaches to educational research.

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Spillane, James P. (2004). <cite>Standards deviation: How schools misunderstand education policy.</cite> Reviewed by Adam Lefstein, King's College, London

  Education Review/Reseñas Educativas/Resenhas Educativas Spillane, James P. (2004). Standards deviati...