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Howe's preferred interpretation of equality of opportunity,
labeled "the participatory educational ideal," is developed
against the backdrop of two weaker conceptions. A "formal"
interpretation, requiring only the absence of formal barriers to
opportunities, is rejected because social factors may prevent
people from making use of those opportunities. The
"compensatory" interpretation insists on providing programs (e.g.
bilingual education) that will remedy disadvantages that some
children bring with them to school (e.g. limited English
proficiency). But this interpretation is also rejected because
it "...implicitly adopts the status quo regarding what is of
educational worth and how this is to be determined. It therefore
fails to afford educational opportunities of equal worth to
individuals who have had no part in shaping the educational
practices and curricular content that are deemed educationally
worthwhile." (p. 31)
The participatory interpretation adopted by Howe amends the
compensatory ideal to insure that oppressed minority groups are
included in deliberations about what is educationally worthwhile.
While appropriating a conception of democratic education
advanced by Amy Gutmann, Howe proposes that her principles of
nonrepression and nondiscrimination be supplemented by a
principle of nonoppression. Unfortunately this principle is
never given a precise formulation, but it is intended to insure
that oppressed groups have the opportunity to participate in
curricular deliberations.
Howe's conception is intended to be a hybrid of a
strong compensatory ideal of equal opportunity—one which sets
high standards for what is to count as a real rather than a
merely formal opportunity—and an ideal that is based on insuring
equal opportunity for groups (identified by ethnicity or gender)
to define the opportunities worth aspiring to. Unfortunately,
philosophical hybrids don't manifest the vigor of their
biological counterparts. Howe acknowledges that individuals may
sometimes choose to receive less or less prestigious education,
but "the mere fact that an individual affirms a choice does not
mean that freedom and opportunities worth wanting exist." (p. 22)
From the compensatory perspective, the lower educational or
social attainment of any group or class is a symptom of unequal
opportunity, an underrepresentation that demands remediation.
Howe points out, for example, that "by virtue of various features
of their context of choice, women still experience diminished
educational opportunities overall in comparison to men
(especially in math and science). As a result, they also
experience diminished employment opportunities." (p. 67)
The participatory perspective may, however, pull in a
different direction. If, to take an example, the voices of
evangelical Christians and orthodox Jews and Moslems—women as
well as men—were truly heeded, differential educational outcomes
by gender would be expected. Indeed, these women would not view
their lower pay as a sign of "diminished" educational or economic
opportunities. Like many liberal egalitarians, Howe assumes that
respecting the "voices" of groups who have not usually had a seat
at the table where decisions are made will at the same time move
us toward the kind of society which fosters individual
opportunity for all. But this is probably a mistake.
Indeed, a partisan of the participatory ideal who draws on
such theorists as Iris Marion Young ought to look more favorably
than does Howe on school vouchers, for here is a way to honor
group differences by giving all groups control of their own
children's education. Howe is aware of such a rationale for
school choice but notes that in practice choice programs
frequently put the poor at a disadvantage, "Lack of information,
lack of time, lack of transportation, lack of childcare, and lack
of trust are among the reasons to worry that the poor have a
compromised context of choice in comparison with the
nonpoor." (p. 119) No doubt Howe is right, but some of these
deficiencies could be offset in a voucher program that offered
vouchers whose value varied inversely with income.
Howe's dim view of voucher programs as well as of tracking
and standardized testing goes beyond his prediction that such
programs will simply reinforce existing inequalities. He
believes that all such programs are based on a defective vision
of schooling, a vision in which economic efficiency and
individual mobility dominate and democratic community evaporates.
According to Howe's participatory educational ideal, "the first
responsibility of public schooling is to educate its students for
democratic participation." (83) From this point of view, the
current public focus on scholastic achievement in academic
subjects, on programs for the gifted and talented, and on strategies
to privatize portions or all of education serves only
to undermine the school's true mission, the development of
democratic character.
Given the centrality Howe accords this mission, I would have
liked to know more precisely first what he meant by education for
democratic citizenship, and second, how he identified the
threshold beyond which divergent programs and aspirations would
be permissible. Consider what Howe has to say about the first:
He notes that democratic education won't magically take care of
itself, and that the notion that the liberal arts "can serve, by
themselves to foster democracy is but an unexamined article of
faith."(p. 84) Howe goes on to say that "...some traditional
educational goals should be adopted for all K-12 students—basic
literacy and numeracy, for instance, as well as some literature,
some art, some history, some science, some geography, and so
forth." (p. 84) Howe identifies "the virtue of recognition, the
capacity for democratic deliberation, and the prospect for
gainful employment, for instance" as central to his
participatory ideal. (p. 84)" Howe elaborates a bit in a subsequent
chapter: "The goal of democratic character requires fostering
general habits of mind that render individuals capable of and
disposed to gathering and evaluating information, scientific and
otherwise. There is little in the way of 'content knowledge'
that everyone needs to know.... Although all students need to
think like democratic citizens, it is by no means obvious that
all need to learn to think like scientists, mathematicians,
historians, literary critics, and philosophers. Indeed, how
could they master all of these perspectives?" (p. 106)
I find this terribly vague. Read one way, it provides the
basis for an argument against compulsory schooling that extends
beyond the elementary level. Read another, it's an apology for
the curricular status quo. Read still a third way, with emphasis
placed on developing students' "capacity for evaluating
information, scientific and otherwise," it could ground a case
for mandatory liberal arts education to an advanced level.
Moreover, given Howe's commitment to involving all segments of
the population in the process of defining the curriculum and
given Howe's recognition that E.D. Hirsch offers "a good piece of
advice for the disadvantaged" (p. 57) in proposing that they learn
the knowledge associated with power and success, why would Howe
say that only "basic literacy and numeracy" are universal goals?
Not only is Howe's conception of democratic education
exasperatingly vague, the justification for having this
educational goal trump all others is nowhere provided. Perhaps,
Howe is simply embracing Gutmann's position that we are all, in
fact, committed to preserving and enhancing democracy. But even
if a commitment to preserve democracy may be taken for granted,
is that commitment tantamount to an endorsement of the strong
form of equality of opportunity that Howe embraces? The
connection between democracy and a strong form of equal
educational opportunity cannot simply be taken for granted; it
must be explicitly spelled out and argued for, especially in view
of Gutmann's own position maintaining that a commitment to
democratic education is consistent with a much weaker conception
of equal educational opportunity.
Despite my concern about key unanswered questions in Howe's
position, he makes many keen and perceptive points. For example,
in a chapter on testing, Howe argues convincingly that in
analyzing the consequences of testing programs, attempts to
segregate "pure" value questions from those amenable to
scientific investigation cannot succeed. In his chapter on school
choice, he perceptively notes that when voucher proponents like
Chubb and Moe maintain that vouchers are more likely than public
schools to satisfy the preferences of their clients, "the
question of whether school choice increases achievement is
largely beside the point." (p. 116). Here, he also reminds those of
us who need reminding that libertarian rhetoric about government
imposition of partisan values notwithstanding, government
intervention may also support the cause of justice as in the 1954
Brown decision outlawing segregated school systems. Finally, I
think that Howe's overall stance of basing substantial proposals
on ideals that are already conceded is well taken. To give him
the last word, "Joining the conversation and moving it in the
right direction has the best chance of success, if, rather than
prodding people to give up their deeply held principles, it prods
them to reflect upon and consequently live up to what these
principles demand." (p. 33)
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