Elizabeth DeBray-Pelot September 3, 2008 Writing in The New Republic in 2005, Robert Gordon of
the Center for American Progress argued that the Democratic Party
ought to stop lambasting No Child Left Behind: “It’s
stunning to see Democrats lose their edge on education.”
Criticizing his party for what he saw as its sole demands for
“money, money, and money,” he proposed that the
Democrats’ first task in building an affirmative education
policy agenda should be . . . to stop the unprincipled attacks on NCLB. At its heart, this is the sort of law liberals once dreamed about. In the 1970s, liberal litigators fell one vote short of a Supreme Court decision requiring evenhanded education funding. NCLB doesn’t guarantee funding, but it goes one step further by demanding educational results. It says that, when states accept federal funding, they must ensure that all children (except the most disabled) meet “challenging academic standards. This has made achievement a legal command, not just a gauzy aspiration. The law requires a form of affirmative action: States must show that poor and minority students are achieving proficiency like everyone else, or else provide remedies targeted to the schools those students attend. The law’s unyielding demands have created a powerful tool to raise both expectations and money (Gordon, 2005). Gordon is speaking as part of the left that views NCLB as a
legislative boon to the civil rights agenda. Michael Rebell and
Jessica Wolff’s Moving Every Child Ahead: From
NCLB Hype to Meaningful Educational Opportunity similarly
takes this view. However, these authors go into far greater
detail about what kind of federal-state compact might enhance the
likelihood of realizing what they see as NCLB’s promise.
Drawing on papers presented at a convening of policy scholars
at Teachers College Columbia in fall of 2006, entitled
“Examining America’s Commitment to Closing
Achievement Gaps: NCLB and its Alternatives,” the book
presents a vision of a federal role that, in addition to holding
schools accountable, would require states to provide students
with both in-school and out- of-school opportunities to learn.
What’s different about this work is that it advances an
intellectual and legal framework for how the federal role might
actually be re-shaped. Outside of legal circles, that kind of
contribution has been rare over the course of the past seven
years, during which the policy community has primarily analyzed
the politics behind NCLB’s enactment (DeBray, 2006;
McGuinn, 2006; McDonnell, 2005); studied and reported on various
implementation problems while making recommendations for
improvements to the law (i.e., Sunderman, Kim, & Orfield,
2005); and critiqued the emphasis on testing at the expense of
other goals (Rothstein, 2004; Valenzuela, 2004; Nichols &
Berliner, 2007). Intellectually, Rebell and Wolff’s work is most strongly
related to work by a group of legal scholars, based at the Earl
Warren Institute in the Boalt Hall School of Law at UC Berkeley
– Goodwin Liu, Stephen Sugarman, Dean Christopher Edley,
Jr., and scholars from other universities, including Rebell
himself -- who have been engaged in a project entitled
Rethinking Rodriguez. Many of the writing stemming from
the project has involved an investigation of possible legal and
legislative avenues to securing the right to education, which has
been recognized in human rights law (see Robinson, 2007). These
scholars’ legal perspectives run a wide gamut: some
disagree with the Supreme Court’s legal reasoning in its
1973 opinion in San Antonio v. Rodriguez and contend that
education should be recognized as a fundamental right. Others,
like Matthew Brunnell, argue “that education should be
recognized as a judicially enforceable right, but that it need
not be a fundamental right” (Robinson, 2007, p. 1685).
Goodwin Liu has argued that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
national citizenship clause authorizes Congress to “ensure
a meaningful floor of educational opportunity throughout the
nation” (Liu, 2006, p. 330). The intersection between this
Boalt Hall project and Rebell and Wolff’s book is the
question of how federal policy might work toward ensuring that
states provide an adequate education, or “meaningful
educational opportunity.” Rebell and Wolff, like Liu and
Robinson, contend that federal legislation can play a major role
in establishing this right (though both Liu and Robinson argue
for doing so in provisions other than the NCLB statute).
The book’s introductory chapters (1-3) outline the
history of “equality of opportunity” in American
education, document and discuss the extent of poverty and
inequality as it affects education, and trace the evolution of
federal policy to the point of No Child Left Behind. While these
chapters are all important context for their argument,
particularly for readers less fluent in the history of the
federal role, it is in Chapters Four through Nine that that they
lay out their vision for modification of the federal role:
creating “meaningful educational opportunity” as well
as ameliorating what they see as the unworkable accountability
provisions of the current statute. I will focus my review on
those chapters. The central problem with NCLB implementation, according to the
authors, is that the law’s stated emphasis on opportunity
has been de-emphasized in favor of the accountability
provisions. This over-emphasis has put the federal role, as it
actually plays out at the ground level of instructional practice
and state administration, out of balance. The emphasis on all
students proficient by 2014 has led to short-sightedness with
respect to the law’s stated goal of “ensuring that
all children have a fair, equal and significant opportunity to
obtain a high quality education.” They write (p. 41): Althoughaccountability pressures can affect the motivation of school personnel and influence their performance to some degree, the critical goals of the act – elimination of the achievement gap and sustained, high-level academic achievement by virtually all students—cannot be achieved unless mechanisms are also put into place that recognize and overcome the severe opportunity gaps created by the conditions of poverty [described in this chapter]. Building on what states have done in efforts to secure an
adequate education, the federal level could attempt to enforce
that states are engaged in assuring “meaningful”
educational opportunity for its students. Observing that the
term “significant” made its way into NCLB, they
suggest that in future iterations, Congress instead use the term
“meaningful,” because it has been used by state
courts and legislatures in ways that have been tied to tangible
resources and benefits for students (p 64). This idea is akin,
though not identical to, what Kimberly Jenkins Robinson has
written (pp. 1713-1714): that the federal right to education
could be defined through legislation; and that “the legal
requirement would mandate that states provide equal educational
opportunity while the inclusion of the aim of developing each
child to her or his fullest potential serves to encourage states
to increase educational opportunities and to discourage states
from engaging in substantial leveling down of revenues, which
occurred in some districts after school finance decisions
required equality in the school finance
system.” Indeed, a large part of what Rebell and Wolff argue is that
over the past several decades, state courts have had to grapple,
through litigation about educational adequacy, with the
components of state constitutional rights to (for instance),
“thorough and efficient education,” “high
quality education,” or “sound basic
education.” They assert that there is a state court
consensus that has identified essential school-based resources,
including (p. 71-72): “effective teachers, principals, and
other personnel; appropriate class sizes; adequate school
facilities; rich and rigorous curricula; a full platform of
services, including guidance services, after-school, summer, and
weekend programming, tutoring; and additional time on task for
students from backgrounds of poverty. . . “ (the list
continues beyond this excerpt) Central to Rebell and Wolff’s argument is that Congress
should. . . undertake “a comprehensive study on the costs
to states and local districts of 1) complying with the
administrative processes of NCLB; and 2) achieving the
proficiency goals of NCLB and/or closing the achievement
gap.” (p. 103) Further, they write, “the
comprehensive cost analyses should consider the costs not only of
essential school-based resources, but also the costs of the most
important out-of-school support services that students from
backgrounds of concentrated poverty need to succeed on a
sustained basis.” (p. 103) The authors assume that from
this knowledge base and agreement on what constitutes
“meaningful” educational opportunity would flow
legislation, and then administrative oversight. The strength of this work is that it looks to a vision of the
federal role way beyond the confines of test-based accountability
– it looks beyond the traditional framework of categorical
programs to a more comprehensive vision. “To implement
NCLB effectively and to realize the Brown vision, then,
what is needed at this point is to identify the key elements of
meaningful educational opportunity that have been substantiated
by educational research and articulated in legal and legislative
terms by the courts, Congress, and state legislatures in the
past, and to shape them into statutory concepts that can give
substance, direction, and coherence to the act.” (p 65)
By playing an active role in defining “adequacy,”
Congress would be building on what the authors describe as the
knowledge base accrued in state-level adequacy lawsuits.
These are the twin principles on which the book rests: that
the opportunity part of the legislation should be developed AND
the NCLB version of accountability improved upon. The authors,
remaining consistent throughout in their argument that NCLB is
the right model for closing the achievement gap, are dedicated to
fixing its accountability flaws. Chapter 7 is the authors’
recommendations about how state content standards may be
certified as high-quality and valid; how adequate yearly progress
can be calibrated to a growth model; and how unworkable adequate
yearly progress requirements for special education and limited
English-proficient students at the school level can be scaled
back while still ensuring these students have opportunities to
learn the curriculum. In insisting that the two precepts cannot
be divorced from each other, they never fundamentally question
whether the NCLB accountability paradigm is too proscriptive for
states, whether the sub-group accountability requirements might
have consequences for racially diverse schools that are beyond
repair, or whether the mandated testing in grades 3 through 8
might be scaled back in favor of supporting the other kinds of
interventions they care about. However, there are several underlying legal, political, and
administrative issues with which the authors do not deal
explicitly. One is constitutional: the right to
“meaningful opportunity” would presumably be secured
in legislation. However, as long as San Antonio v.
Rodriguez stands as the Supreme Court’s decided
opinion, the authors are assuming constitutional-level authority
from a federal statutory provision, which makes its ultimate
enforceability subject to challenge. Even if questions of constitutionality could be resolved,
there is the question of how stable the consensus derived from
adequacy lawsuits actually is. In asserting that there is a
“state court consensus” that could be drawn upon to
help determine “meaningful” opportunity, Rebell and
Wolff oversimplify the contentiousness surrounding the different
methodologies for costing out adequacy at the state level. For
instance, the “professional judgment” method is
vastly different from the econometric approach (see, for
instance, West & Peterson, 2007). Yet another critical problem is how, exactly, federal
authority and enforcement would work. Even when bright lines for
states’ compliance are clearly spelled out, as they were,
for instance with the 1994 Improving America’s Schools Act,
it is still the U.S. Department of Education-- an administrative
agency that has relatively limited potential for oversight
– that must ensure that compliance. The idea that the
current Office of Elementary and Secondary Education or Office of
Intergovernmental and International Affairs (my assumption, they
don’t mention particular offices) could assume
responsibility for determining states’ adherence to
providing educational opportunity is dubious. Even with the benefit of the sophisticated cost studies they
advocate, the federal-state negotiations around “meaningful
opportunity” could be endless. States would submit plans
and reports to the Department of Education about the resources
they are providing and capacity-building offering in the major
categories established by the cost studies; the Department, in
turn, would present them in a way to make comparisons among
states. They write that, “Presumably, education officials
and policymakers in states that are failing to provide
appropriate resources will be pressed by their constituents to
provide more resources and to improve their practices” (p.
150). Just as successful adequacy lawsuits at the state level
have often led to confusion and gridlock in legislatures about
the remedies, there is a built-in layer of ambiguity about what
the standards for such investments would be, who would decide,
and once agreed upon, who would enforce them. Would federal
officials approve a state’s plan that budgets extra for
pre-K programs if that state reduced its investment in
interventions for adolescents, an approach often favored by
policymakers on the basis of the so-called “inoculation
theory”? (see McPartland & Jordan, 1999) What about
class-size reduction versus signing bonuses aimed at attracting
teachers to rural or urban areas? Particularly if the current
chilly state budget climate persists, it is hard to picture
federal officials sanctioning states for inadequate
investments. Another consideration is the political difficulty of passing
such a provision. When Congress considered creating a
quasi-governmental body (the National Education Standards and
Improvement Council) to certify not just state-level content
standards but also “opportunity-to-learn” standards
as part of the 1994 ESEA reauthorization, it was not only
conservative Republicans that sabotaged it. Many governors
feared that conversations about “opportunity” would
become a means to hold states back indefinitely from moving ahead
with standards, testing, and accountability (Jennings, 1998).
While the authors are right that NCLB has created some
legislative precedent for change in this regard, there is always
going to be some nervousness in Congress about directing states
with regard to ensuring opportunity. While true that the
contours of the “meaningful educational opportunity”
proposed here would be derived from the states, rather than
imposed from on high, any federal certifying function (whether a
board or not) is not going to be completely divorced from
political influence. It is worth recalling that in the early 1990s, when
“opportunity-to-learn” standards (sometimes also
called “school delivery standards”) were being
debated, the National Governors Association (1993) produced a
report, The Debate on Opportunity to Learn Standards, that
analyzed several possible approaches. Numerous scholars,
including Andrew Porter, Richard Elmore, and Susan Fuhrman, wrote
papers as background. One of the fundamental questions that the
report raised was, “What role should outcomes, processes,
and inputs play in monitoring education performance?”
(p.22) I remind us of this report because I wonder whether some
of the earlier versions of proposals around opportunity-to-learn
for states might be revived as a more workable set of principles
to guide the future federal-state relationship than would be the
undertaking of a national-level costing out of, and subsequent
attempt to administer, meaningful educational opportunity. In
other words, if a parsimonious model of basic school-delivery
standards for states could be agreed upon, as some advocates,
scholars, and politicians in the early 1990s hoped, it might
prove an administratively manageable approach (though as I noted
earlier, it will never be a politically simple matter to specify
those delivery standards). Finally, the assurance of a right to meaningful education
through legislation should logically necessitate a far greater
financial contribution from the federal government. It seems
axiomatic that an establishment of a federal right to a
meaningful (or adequate) education means a larger federal
expenditure to ensure and enforce it. Robinson writes that
“the assistance should reward those state that make
good-faith efforts to provide the right to education. The
federal government should also provide financial assistance to
those states that encounter obstacles but make progress toward
their goals. Financial assistance would serve as incentive for
states to take action to guarantee the federal right and the
amount would only provide a portion of the funds needed to cure
the educational challenges confronting states.”
(1721-22). Rebell and Wolff don’t specify by how much the federal
contribution should increase; or by how much the states’
obligations would increase. It is clear that such discussions of
a more proactive federal role in education are taking place
during a time of uncertain expenditures on the domestic side of
the budget. However, budgetary priorities are also apt to
change, and though perhaps not as quickly, so can legislative and
judicial antecedents to recognition of education as a right.
This, too, raises myriad questions about what the nature of
federal spending should be. Would the feds need to help remedy
inter-state inequalities in per-pupil expenditures? If so, will
members of Congress willingly approve greater absolute
expenditures to some states whose needs are considered greater
than those of others? What proportion of any new federal dollars
would go into instructional programs; or what proportion for
community supports and anti-poverty initiatives or birth-age 3
programs? These are precisely the questions that the five
justices in the majority in Rodriguez feared were a
slippery slope. Beyond this is the problem that the
over-emphasis of the federal role on school-level accountability
is no simple matter to reverse, as states already have many sunk
costs invested in the NCLB model (see DeBray-Pelot & McGuinn,
forthcoming). Rebell and Wolff, by striving for the legislative fulfillment
of Brown in the next ESEA reauthorization, demonstrate how
much bold aspirations and new intellectual foundations have been
missing in the discussion of what should come next for the
federal role in education – both its aims and the
mechanisms to support them. This work, along with that of other
legal scholars I have discussed, helps to form that foundation.
The biggest criticism of their proposal from conservative circles
will undoubtedly be that it unrealistically defies the
traditional, definable “bright lines” of the ESEA and
expands the federal role too far into the realm of opportunity to
learn. The challenge they pose, though, is to ask what the
current bright lines (and lack of theory behind them) really have
wrought against the backdrop of poverty and inequality. Thinking
through how legislation ought to be crafted to support a stronger
federal role in capacity-building and a less punitive role in
school accountability is a very productive direction.
It is perhaps too easy to look at such an ambitious new
theoretical blueprint for the federal role and point out, as I
have here, the too-limited administrative capacity and budgets,
and the inevitable political hurdles that would have to be
cleared to fulfill them. What is vital is that we have them and
deliberate about them. References DeBray, E. (2006). Politics, ideology, and education:
Federal policy during the Clinton and Bush administrations
(New York: Teachers College Press, 2006). DeBray-Pelot,E. & McGuinn, P. (forthcoming, 2009). The
new politics of education: Analyzing the national educational
policy landscape in the post-NCLB era. Educational
Policy. Gordon, R. (2005, June 6). Class struggle: What Democrats
need to say about education. The New Republic.
Jennings, J. (1998). Why National Standards and Tests?
Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. Liu, G. (2006). Education, equality, and national
citizenship. 116 Yale Law Journal 330. McDonnell, L. (2005). NCLB and the federal role in education:
Evolution or revolution? Peabody Journal of Education
80:2, 19-38. McGuinn, P. (2006). No Child Left Behind and transformation
of federal education policy, 1965-2005. Lawrence, KS:
University Press of Kansas. McPartland, J. & Jordan, W. (1999). Older students also
need major federal compensatory education resources. In G.
Orfield and E. DeBray (Eds.), Hard Work for Good Schools:
Facts Not Fads in Title I Reform (Cambridge, MA: Civil Rights
Project at Harvard), pp.102-110. National Governors Association (1993). The Debate on
opportunity-to-learn standards. Washington, DC:
Author. Nichols, S. & Berliner, D. (2007) Collateral damage:
How high-stakes testing corrupts America’s schools.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard Education Press. Rebell, M. & Wolff, J. (2008). Moving every child
ahead: From NCLB hype to meaningful educational opportunity.
New York: Teachers College Press. Robinson, K.J. (2007). The case for a collaborative
enforcement model for a federal right to education. 40 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 1653. Rothstein, R. (2004). Class and schools. New York:
Teachers College Press. Sunderman, G., Kim, J., & Orfield, G. (2005). NCLB meets
school realities: Lessons from the field. Newbury Park, CA:
Corwin Press. Valenzuela, A., Ed. (2004). Leaving children behind: How
Texas-style accountability fails latino youth. Albany, NY:
State University of New York Press. West, M. & Peterson, P. (Eds.) (2007). School money
trials: The legal pursuit of educational adequacy.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. Elizabeth DeBray-Pelot is an Associate Professor in the Department of Lifelong Education, Administration, and Policy in the College of Education, University of Georgia, and Associate Director for Policy of the Georgia Education Policy & Evaluation Center. She received her Ed.D. in Administration, Planning and Social Policy from the Harvard Graduate School of Education in 2001. Her major interests are the implementation and effects of federal and state elementary and secondary school policies, and the politics of education. Dr. DeBray-Pelot served as program analyst in the Office of Educational Research and Improvement (OERI), United States Department of Education, from 1992 to 1996. She is author of Politics, Ideology, and Education: Federal Policy during the Clinton and Bush Administrations (Teachers College Press, 2006), which analyzes the politics of the reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act in the 106th and 107th Congresses. |
Tuesday, July 1, 2025
Rebell, Michael & Wolff, Jessica (2008). Moving Every Child Ahead: From NCLB Hype to Meaningful Educational Opportunity. (Foreword by Susan Fuhrman) Elizabeth DeBray-Pelot, University of Georgia
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