Kosar, Kevin R. (2005). Failing grades: The federal politics of education standards. Reviewed by Gregory Camilli, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey

Kosar, Kevin R. (2005). Failing grades: The federal politics of education standards. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 240 Pages ISBN 1-58826-388-6 Reviewed by Gregory Camilli Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey March 6, 2006 To set Standards, and enforce Standards, and raise Standards, and raise them ever more, was nearly the whole duty of teachers principals, and presidents…. It was a real and salutary gospel in its day. For American education in the Nineties was a variegated hodgepodge of uncoordinated practices, which had never undergone any scrutiny from anyone, and many of which were shoddy, futile, and absurd…and the Age of Standards, as the period from 1890 to 1915 may come to be called … brought some order out of that chaos. (McConn, 1936, p. 447) In Failing grades, we read on page 1 that according to National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) “75% of the 22,000 U.S. students who took the assessments scores below proficient.” Not a single state approached proficiency for even half of its students. The best U.S. result was from Massachusetts where only 39% of grade eight students scored proficient or above. From an international perspective, the 1999 Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) included Massachusetts grade 8 students. Only six countries scored significantly higher than Massachusetts: Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan and Belgium. But it is also fair to say that the entire U.S. students’ average was in the middle of the pack. The solution to this problem, nay crisis, according to Kevin R. Kosar, is to raise standards and to ensure, by exercise of federal authority, that all states set and maintain High Standards. Only then, the story goes, will the U.S. be successful in an increasingly competitive world economy. There are many enlightening sidebars to this message. We read that “Citizens’ ability to comprehend government action and judge its legitimacy is in part contingent on their knowledge of previous governmental policymaking, the Constitution, and so forth” (p. 42). I take this to mean Kosar believes there are legitimate purposes for education other than economic competition. Also, Kosar agrees with Berliner and Biddle (authors of the Manufactured Crisis) that test scores haven’t declined over the last thirty years. (“On this point they are correct.”) Rather, the argument is that U.S. achievement is low relative to that of other developed countries. So Kosar appears to reject central premises of the report A Nation at Risk, infamous for its cherry-picking of the declining trend from 1969-1977 of NAEP science scores for 17 year-olds—the only downward trend across nine age and content categories. In fact, the book goes into great detail in Chapter 1 to dispel the notion of a “Rising Tide of Mediocrity,” and does quite well at making this point aside from a number of minor psychometric errors and omissions. For example, the ACT test is not an aptitude test; the correction for guessing procedure on the SAT is described incorrectly; in TIMSS, average student age is significantly correlated with scale scores; and both the SAT and ACT have been recentered in recent years. Evidence of low U.S. achievement comes from international rankings, and from the percent of students who are considered at least "Proficient," according to the NAEP proficiency categories. The primary implication that follows from this fact is that the U.S. is in a position to lose its competitive edge. If most of our students scored at the top of the world―the reasoning appears to run―continued economic health would be insured. I am dismayed by the probability that this plausible conclusion is incorrect, and that most knowledgeable people in the business world know it is incorrect (though this is not a conversation they have with educators). In fact, the conclusion has at its roots a kind of supply-side economics: a larger pool of talented scientists and engineers will create more high-paying jobs and more technological innovation. But take into account that the rest of the world is catching up to the U.S. in producing an educated workforce; then take into account that in general these workers have much lower levels of compensation; and the result is inescapable: expert labor is a commodity, and outsourcing is not restricted to manufacturing jobs. Expert labor needs are increasingly being determined by means of business models that consider quality and price—but not national boundaries. And aside from my personal opinion, there is strikingly little evidence to support the putative causal arrow that points from educational levels to economic productivity at the international level. (But in any event, what has happened in the past is water over the dam.) Kosar also mentions a different kind of argument for attaining a college degree, namely that within the U.S. salary levels and educational levels are substantially correlated. However, this latter argument is only loosely connected, as a motivator, to the “standards solution” proposed in Chapter 2. “Standards” are here put forward as the solution to the problem of low achievement, and the varieties of standards— content, performance and opportunity-to-learn—are delineated in Chapter 2. Some evidence is offered to support their efficacy. Kosar cites one text maintaining that the “premises behind establishing high standards…are sound.” Test score results from Kentucky and Texas are then reviewed. Not unexpectedly, both hope and ambiguity arise during such an exercise. Yes, Texas scores were up, but the magnitude of the increases was not corroborated by NAEP; yes, the achievement gap decreased, but there was evidence that the tests were too easy; yes, Grissmer in a pre-election paper linked the gains to state policies, but the paper was empirically weak and had little impact. (Camilli, 2000; Haney, 2000; Klein et al., 2000) Far be it from me to oppose High Standards, but there is precious little evidence that current accountability systems have had anything but weak effects (Braun, 2005; Amrein & Berliner, 2003; Nichols, Glass, and Berliner, 2006). Unlike some of my colleagues, however, I would say that the jury is still out. The problem in any standardization scheme is that the consideration of both standards and individual differences forces the U.S. education policy makers, as McConn (p. 450) noted, “to construct a synthesis that shall embody the valid aspects of both principles.” Kosar (p. 59) partially acknowledges this difficulty: “Clearly not all students can learn to the same high standards,” but he glosses over the point that NCLB standards encompass students, teachers, and states. Balancing, through flexibility, must be a systemic activity. Given the low rankings of U.S. students, economic and civic necessities, and the failure of states to impose High Standards, Kosar advocates that the federal government should step in and take over this enterprise. And it is true that the percentages of students deemed proficient both vary widely by state and have very little relationship to state NAEP results. This is a problem because sanctions under the No Child Left Behind Act flow from the state assessment results. However, the word “failure” in the first sentence of this paragraph should be recognized as value-laden, and its implication would certainly be disputed by a number of state governments. Thus, Kosar shows his hand as a liberal, but one located in a flood of actors contributing to the standards movement. There are also conservatives, Democrats, Republicans, and those suspicious of federal involvement, whom Kosar dubs “antistatists.” Liberals want government involvement, antistatists do not; Republicans and Democrats squabble over money and school prayer, and antistatists are somewhat cagey about whether they are conservatives. Advocates of quality schools, on the other hand, may get to choose their affiliation and still be okay. I would ask one question in an attempt to cut through this panoply of political postures. Is accountability for public schools a state or federal responsibility? I found Chapters 3 through 6 to be enlightening. Being neither an historian nor a political scientist, I had heard bits and pieces of this story, but Kosar has integrated it into a whole, and the book is a worthwhile read on the strength of this material. The story wends from desegregation, through the accomplishments of James Conant Bryant (though not by name), to the previously mentioned Nation at Risk report, and on to the deepening federal involvement in public schools, culminating with the No Child Left Behind. The idea of national testing is neither Democratic nor Republican; it is simply controversial. It is ostensibly driven by economic fears, having previously been driven by cold war fears. Autonomy is continuously pitted against the need for resources, both within states and between states and the Feds. In this policy battle, the debate over unfunded education mandates has centered around opportunity-to-learn standards. While states receive aid from the Feds, they are obligated to meet measurable goals in terms of curriculum and assessments, and to provide a certain level of education services (e.g., highly qualified teachers). In legislative language, this is referred to as "performance based on accountability" versus "performance based on inputs"; and in the legislative process, don’t be surprised when battles over school prayer and privatization sidetrack bills attempting to tackle these tough issues. Kosar chronicles the compromises by which controversial amendments are struck and core demands from the left and right are bedded. Why indeed would a Republican Congress castrate the Goals 2000 legislation and then enact a more extreme version of standardization? The Voluntary National Test met a similar fate, but the agenda of creating a better system of federal monitoring of state progress survived and began to flourish under NCLB. The irony here is that many advocate monitoring, but many are also strongly opposed to a national curriculum. A single test embodies a single model of curriculum content, hence a compromise on monitoring entails abandoning a national test. NCLB arose from the enduring (perceived) needs exemplified in the initiatives endorsed by A Nation at Risk through the Voluntary National Test, but was enacted as a set of compromises. States rather than the Feds were to create their own content and performance standards, but rewards and sanctions were determined by state-developed assessments. Opportunity-to-learn standards were included, but so was a massive increase in federal support. Privatization and school prayer were omitted, but students in failed schools were provided allowances to enroll at more successful schools. Title I and other federal support were used as the vehicle;and all students achieving to the same High Standards, as defined within states, became the mantra. Yet Kosar argues that states nonetheless retain the flexibility under this arrangement to defeat federal regulations. Opportunity-to-learn standards, for example, are diluted by hiring teachers’ aides rather than highly qualified teachers. Likewise, some states set the bar for student proficiency artificially low, thus vitiating the utility of High Standards. In short, “politics has triumphed over advisable policy,” and any attempt to improve education must therefore take an incrementalist approach, given the current constraints of NCLB. Some suggestions for improving the educational system are offered in Chapter 7. First, Kosar thinks states should establish state standards. Good, and incidentally, this is already done for the most part. Second, limit standard-raising to mathematics, reading, and science. This might not be okay; it will lead to a massive reordering and unwarranted focus of resources in schools with at-risk students. Third, require states to use assessment aligned with content standards. Good, this is already being done—even though alignment is less exact than many believe. Fourth, encourage states to have their standards benchmarked. Okay, but benchmarking often favors precision over desirability. Fifth, align teacher pre-service training with state standards. Question, what does one do when the standards change, as they often do? Sixth, analyze the capabilities of state departments of education…and offer more technical assistance. Good, this can’t hurt and national resources are currently being marshaled for this exact purpose. Seven, bring back the wall chart. Not so good, but states are developing better ways to monitor student progress. Eight, Rework AYP. Yes, this is being done as I write. Finally, expand testing requirements to more high schools. Okay, but the Feds will need to provide more resources for this. What’s the first phrase that pops into your head? [Editor: Fat chance.] Kosar's advice is quite in keeping with current trends. In this regard, there is nothing new in Failing Grades. Similar arguments for standards have been made for at least a century, though similar arguments for federal involvement have been made more recently. The interesting questions are “What are we doing differently to resolve the ‘crisis’ in student achievement?” and “Does the federal government have a better chance in this century to accomplish this feat given the compromises so ably detailed in the book?” Kosar thinks that small repairs of present policy inadequacies will help, as will more forceful regulatory oversight by the Feds. But does he think it will work? “Raising standards through Title I’s indirect mechanisms will remain a struggle for the foreseeable future. It is, however, a struggle well worth undertaking.” References Amrein, Audrey L. & Berliner, David C. (2002). High-stakes testing, uncertainty, and student learning Education Policy Analysis Archives, 10(18). Retrieved 3/2/2006 from http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v10n18/. Braun, Henry. (2004). Reconsidering the impact of high-stakes testing, Education Policy Analysis Archives, 12(1). Retrieved 3/2/2006 from http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v12n1/. Camilli, Gregory. (2000). Texas gains on NAEP: Points of light? Education Policy Analysis Archives, 8(42). Retrieved March 2, 2006 from http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v8n42.html. Haney, Walt. (2000). The myth of the Texas miracle in education. Education Policy Analysis Archives, 8(41). Retrieved March 2, 2006 from http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v8n41/. Klein, Stephen P.; Hamilton, Laura S.; McCaffrey, Daniel F. & Stecher, Brian M. (2000). What do test scores in Texas tell us? Education Policy Analysis Archives, 8(49). Retrieved March 2, 2006 from http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v8n49/. McConn, Max. (1936). The U.S.es and abuses of examinations. In H.E. Hawkes, E.F. Lindquist & C.R. Mann, (Eds.), The construction and us.e of achievement examinations. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Nichols, Sharon L., Glass, Gene V, & Berliner, David C. (2006). High-stakes testing and student achievement: Does accountability pressure increase student learning? Education Policy Analysis Archives, 14(1). Retrieved 3/2/2006 from http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v14n1/ About the Reviewer Gregory Camilli Rutgers University 10 Seminary Place New Brunswick, NJ 08903 Gregory Camilli is Professor in the Rutgers Graduate School of Education. His interests include measurement, program evaluation, and policy issues regarding student assessment. Dr. Camilli teaches courses in statistics and psychometrics, structural equation modeling, and meta-analysis. His current research projects include efficacy studies of phonics instruction, school factors in mathematics achievement, and differential item functioning. Copyright is retained by the first or sole author, who grants right of first publication to the Education Review.