Carlson, Jerry S. & Levin, Joel R. (Eds.) (2007). Educating the evolved mind: Conceptual foundations for an evolutionary educational psychology. Reviewed by Keith S. Taber, University of Cambridge, U.K

Carlson, Jerry S. & Levin, Joel R. (Eds.) (2007). Educating the evolved mind: Conceptual foundations for an evolutionary educational psychology. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing, Inc. 216 pp.     $39.99 (paper cover)     ISBN 978-1-59311-612-5 Reviewed by Keith S. Taber University of Cambridge, U.K December 14, 2007 This book, edited by Jerry S. Carlson and Joel R. Levin, is a volume in a series on Psychological Perspectives on Contemporary Educational Issues (that itself follows in book form an earlier series Issues in Education: Contributions from Educational Psychology). The format is a focal essay, a series of commentaries, and then a response from the author of the focal piece. The eponymous lead essay, making up over half of the volume, is by David Geary (Geary, 2007a). This is a fascinating essay and it is not possible to do justice to the full argument here, but the crux is a distinction between two types of learning events that are considered primary or secondary, depending upon their relationship to the evolution of human cognition, I make a distinction between biologically primary folk knowledge and abilities, that is, competencies that are components of evolved cognitive domains, and biologically secondary knowledge and abilities, that is competencies acquired through formal or informal training. (Geary, 2007a, p. 3) The argument is that humans have, through the process of evolution, developed certain cognitive traits through natural selection. Humans, and earlier hominid ancestors, have been subject to selection pressure in environments where certain types of learning are advantageous. Humans are therefore very good at learning, at least in those contexts where the evolved traits are the effective ways of learning! The current school curriculum however is a relatively novel cultural invention and so there has been no significant selection for cognitive competencies that specifically operate to allow us to do well in academic studies. That is not to say that our evolved learning skills cannot be put to use in this context, but that the match of learning processes and material to be studied may not be close to optimum. This way of thinking to leads to a number of consequences. These include the idea that some learning that people undertake in modern industrial societies will be more readily achieved (being well-served by the cognitive traits we have evolved than others) than other learning (which does not fit as well). Geary’s evolutionary approach goes beyond that general notion to suggest that it is possible to identify areas where there will be a better or weaker fit, and to argue that instructional design can be informed by research that explores human learning from an evolutionary perspective. Of course, the latter principle would seem to have much in common with well-established attempts to develop instructional approaches that building upon research into human cognition that do not depend upon a psychological perspective. The question of how much ‘value is added’ by taking an evolutionary perspective is one that is raised by some of the commentaries in this volume, and on which readers may take different views. Geary argues that an evolutionary perspective offers the possibility of viable, testable hypotheses that may ‘narrow the problem space’ (Geary, 2007b), and so help focus work in potentially fertile directions. Geary connects his argument with notions that the widespread occurrence of domains of ‘folk knowledge’ (D’Andrade, 1995; Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994) in psychology, biology and physics can be understood in evolutionary terms (Mithen, 1998): i.e. in these ‘evolutionary-significant content areas’ (Geary, 2007a), there are understandable selection pressures for humans to be able to learn - about human behaviour, about local fauna and flora, and about the ways in which objects behave when thrown, dropped, chipped etc. Similarly, it is widely accepted that the human brain has evolved to readily learn a spoken language (Chomsky, 1999), but - as Geary points out - learning to read and write (something that is novel on an evolutionary timescale) is recognised to be a source of difficulty for many learners – and has led to much argument about the best instructional methods (e.g. Wyse, 2003). Through this approach Geary is able to offer a definition of this field: Evolutionary educational psychology is the study of the relation between folk knowledge and abilities and accompanying inferential and attributional biases as these influence academic learning in evolutionary novel cultural contexts, such as schools and the industrial workplace. (Geary, 2007a, p. 34) This all seems very reasonable, as far as it goes, and this approach seems to fit well with arguments about the extent to which scientific thinking is just an extension of common sense (as Einstein seemed to think) or something quite different (Wolpert, 1992). This topic is explored in another of the contributions (Klahr, 2007). Certainly the distinction Geary draws between the systems of knowledge learnt through primary biological mechanisms and the formally taught knowledge of the academic discipline resonates well with the account produced in the context of physics education by Joan Solomon (Solomon, 1992) based on what might be termed a social constructivist approach. There is a substantial literature on learners’ ideas in scientific topics (Duit, 2007), much based around the constructivist premise that learners informal ideas have consequences for learning the accepted models presented in the science curriculum science (Taber, 2006), and Geary’s work offers a strong theoretical framework for considering the ongoing debates in this field about the extent to which such ideas may act as barriers to, or starting points for, learning. This is a particularly pertinent point in view of the commentaries (Berch, 2007; Sweller, 2007) that refer to research suggesting that ‘constructivist’ teaching approaches do not work. I am aware that such labels are not used consistently by different authors, but this finding would be rather serious for those education systems (e.g. NZ, UK etc.) where basic constructivist principles are considered to be good practice! Of course a constructivist approach does not imply completely open-ended discovery learning, which clearly has severe limitations in the context of formal education. However, to this reader the wide-spread constructivist approach commonly adopted internationally in science education (e.g. Fensham, 2004; Jenkins, 2000) is very much based upon developing “an understanding of both how to take advantage of evolved abilities and how to circumvent other evolved biases that may make some types of modern learning more difficult” as one of the commentators here summarises the evolutionary approach (Bjorklund, 2007: 120). Indeed, the importance of intuitive learning mechanisms is well-recognised in science education (diSessa, 1993), and informs thinking about science instruction (Hammer, 2004). Such considerations are perfectly compatible with constructivist models of teaching and learning (Taber, 2007/2008). This is just one area touched upon by this wide-ranging perspective, and illustrates how even readers who are sympathetic to the general approach may not entirely agree with how Geary develops his arguments. As one example, Geary links his argument to a particular model of intelligence – something discussed by other contributors to the book (e.g., Ackerman, 2007) - and which may suggest some reinterpretation would be appropriate for those who understand intelligence in somewhat different terms. Geary’s commentators point out that at the moment there is not enough known to widely apply an evolutionary approach to educational problems, so that often evolutionary arguments can be put that support various position. However it is clear that there is much potential here for developing testable models that link to important educational questions – such as the best age to start formal schooling (Bjorklund, 2007). Another contentious issue is highlighted by Geary’s own inclination is to consider that the evolutionary educational perspective supports special attention being paid to the intellectual elite who cope well with academic learning (Geary, 2007a). This is arguable, but it is a deduction that may well be considered to be premature until the field is better developed, and indeed could seem to be somewhat undermined in Geary’s own (Geary, 2007b) response to his commentators, where he discusses how apparent dramatic increases in intelligence in recent decades may be related to changing environmental conditions that have allowed more of the population to come close to their intellectual potential. As always in evolutionary matters, it is possible to construct ‘just so’ stories, which are currently underdetermined by the available evidence. That is not, of course, a reason to criticize attempts to develop theory and suggest testable ideas. All of the contributions to the book are of interest, and indeed some seemed rather brief and could have been usefully extended. I thought Sweller’s (Sweller, 2007) discussion of the evolutionary strategy of limiting variation (as large changes are usually disadvantageous) offered an interesting perspective on the limitations of working memory. From an evolutionary perspective, the severe limitations on how much new information can be held in working memory may seem odd: surely there would be selection pressure for increasing working memory capacity? Could this indicate some evolutionary trade-off, like the one that selects against humans losing the appendix? (As we do not base our diet on grass and the like, the appendix is of little value, a waste of resources, and potentially a source of trouble. However, the appendix has now shrunk to a size where any further reductions significantly increase the likelihood of material getting trapped and leading to appendicitis.) However, I thought that Sweller’s perspective on how working memory works differently for new input and already organised (i.e. ‘chunked’) knowledge structures was quite insightful in making a restricted capacity working memory seem adaptive. Overall then, this is a fascinating and thought-provoking book, about a potentially valuable perspective, if one that is currently in its early stages. Geary sets out the premises and principles that can form the hard core of a fascinating and potentially valuable research programme (Lakatos, 1970). One annoying omission (possibly a vestige of the evolution of the series into book format) is the absence of an index. I imagine many readers who buy this book will want to return to it and re-visit points in both the focal essay and the commentaries. Had the publishers invested in an index they would have made this a much more valuable book. Such an omission seems short-sighted, as human nature being what it is, surely books that do not allow the reader to readily locate key ideas and discussions are less likely to be cited, and so in the long-term will ultimately sell less under the selection pressure operating in the competitive world of academic scholarship? This particular niggle aside, the book is highly recommended. Anyone interested in learning, and in the development of a science of teaching, would do well to consider the central argument. There is much to think about here, much to admire, and potentially much to disagree with - but this is a contribution that should not be ignored. A highly recommended read. References Ackerman, P. L. (2007). Knowledge, abilities and will. In J. R. Levin & J. S. Carlson (Eds.), Educating the Evolved Mind: Conceptual foundations for an evolutionary educational psychology (pp. 101-108). Charlotte, North Carolina: Information Age Publishing. Berch, D. B. (2007). Instructing evolved minds: pedagogically primary strategies for promoting biologically secondary learning. In J. S. Carlson & J. R. Levin (Eds.), Educating the Evolved Mind: Conceptual foundations for an evolutionary educational psychology (pp. 109-118). Charlotte, North Carolina: Information Age Publishing. Bjorklund, D. F. (2007). The most educable of animals. In J. S. Carlson & J. R. Levin (Eds.), Educating the Evolved Mind: Conceptual foundations for an evolutionary educational psychology (pp. 119-129). Charlotte, North Carolina: Information Age Publishing. Carlson, J. S., & Levin, J. R. (2007). Educating the Evolved Mind: Conceptual foundations for an evolutionary educational psychology. Charlotte, North Carolina: Information Age Publishing. Chomsky, N. (1999). Form and meaning in natural languages. In M. Baghramian (Ed.), Modern Philosophy of Language (pp. 294-308). Washington D C: Counterpoint. D’Andrade, R. (1995). The development of cognitive anthropology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. diSessa, A. A. (1993). Towards an epistemology of physics. Cognition and Instruction, 10( 2&3), 105-225. Duit, R. (2007). Bibliography - Students' and Teachers' Conceptions and Science Education. from http://www.ipn.uni-kiel.de/aktuell/stcse/stcse.html Fensham, P. J. (2004). Defining an Identity: The evolution of science education as a field of research. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Geary, D. C. (2007a). Educating the evolved mind: conceptual foundations for an evolutionary educational psychology. In J. S. Carlson & J. R. Levin (Eds.), Educating the Evolved Mind: Conceptual foundations for an evolutionary educational psychology (pp. 1-99). Charlotte, North Carolina: Information Age Publishing. Geary, D. C. (2007b). Educating the evolved mind: reflections and refinements. In J. S. Carlson & J. R. Levin (Eds.), Educating the Evolved Mind: Conceptual foundations for an evolutionary educational psychology (pp. 177-203). Charlotte, North Carolina: Information Age Publishing. Hammer, D. (2004). The variability of student reasoning, Lecture 3: Manifold cognitive resources,. In E. F. Redish & M. Vicentini (Eds.), Research on Physics Education. Bologna/Amsterdam: Italian Physical Society/IOS Press. Hirschfeld, L., & Gelman, S., A. (1994). Towards a topography of mind: an introduction to domain specificity. In L. Hirschfeld & S. A. Gelman (Eds.), Mapping the Mind: Domain Specificity in Cognition and Culture (pp. 3-35). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jenkins, E. W. (2000). Research in science education: time for a health check? Studies in Science Education, 35, 1-25. Klahr, D. (2007). Evolution of scientific thinking: comments on Geary's 'Education the Evolved Mind". In J. S. Carlson & J. R. Levin (Eds.), Educating the Evolved Mind: Conceptual foundations for an evolutionary educational psychology (pp. 155-164). Charlotte, North Carolina: Information Age Publishing. Lakatos, I. (1970). Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes. In I. Lakatos & A. Musgrove (Eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (pp. 91-196). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mithen, S. (1998). The Prehistory of the Mind: a search for the origins of art, religion and science. London: Phoenix. Solomon, J. (1992). Getting to Know about Energy - in School and Society. London: Falmer Press. Sweller, J. (2007). Evolutionary biology and educational psychology. In J. S. Carlson & J. R. Levin (Eds.), Educating the Evolved Mind: Conceptual foundations for an evolutionary educational psychology (pp. 165-175). Charlotte, North Carolina: Information Age Publishing. Taber, K. S. (2006). Beyond Constructivism: the Progressive Research Programme into Learning Science. Studies in Science Education, 42, 125-184. Taber, K. S. (2007/2008). Conceptual resources for learning science: Issues of transience and grain-size in cognition and cognitive structure. International Journal of Science Education, iFirst Article (paper publication due 2008). Wolpert, L. (1992). The Unnatural Nature of Science. London: Faber & Faber. Wyse, D. (2003). The National Literacy Strategy: A critical review of empirical evidence. British Educational Research Journal, 29(6), 903-916. About the Reviewer Keith S. Taber Keith S. Taber is Senior Lecturer in Science Education in the Faculty of Education at the University of Cambridge, U.K. He works with trainee teachers, teachers, and research students, and he is currently convenor of the Science Education Academic Group and Programme Manager for the part-time PhD in Education.